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assuming the equitable viewpoint in "regarding as done that which ought
to be done."
D. W. MARKHAM.
Banks and Banking-Insolvency-Recovery of Funds Held by
Insolvent Bank as Trustee Ex Maleficio.
The trust department of the C. Bank had approximately two hun-
dred small trust accounts, whose uninvested funds had been included in
a general deposit maintained by it in the commercial department. To
facilitate investment the trust department consolidated these small ac-
counts into what it termed a "Mortgage Pool Account," with itself as
trustee, and each estate was credited with a participation certificate to
the extent of its contribution. A consolidated account totaling $155,940
was thereby built up out of which the bank purchased from its own de-
partments, affiliated investment companies, and elsewhere securities ag-
gregating $151,867.34, leaving a cash credit in the pool account of $4,-
072.66. Subsequently the bank dosed its doors, and the plaintiffs were
appointed to succeed it as trustees for the "Mortgage Pool Account."
In this action it was alleged and to some extent proved that the securi-
ties sold to the pool account then had a market value of $60,746.93 less
than the sums actually paid therefor. On this basis plaintiffs sought
to impress the bank's cash in the hands of the Commissioner of Banks
'with a constructive trust in favor of the estates represented by them.
Held, that the judgment of nonsuit be affirmed.-
It is well settled that a fiduciary may be declared a trustee cx wale-
ficio of any profits which he may have acquired through his dealings
with the funds committed to his care,2 and, since creditors are not bona
fide purchasers, the rule is applicable to the receiver 3 of an insolvent
trustee. Such a proceeding, however, is not, as is so often stated, one
to establish a preference, but, rather, an action brought to restore to the
cestui that which equity considers his own.4 Success will depend upon
the proof of two facts: (a) that the alleged trustee, whether express or
ex delicto, has at the outset acquired something of value the beneficial
ownership of which remains, either by express or implied provisions
of the parties, or in the contemplation of law, in another; and (b) that
'Cocke v. Hood, 207 N. C. 14, 175 S. E. 841 (1934).
23 PoMEROY, EQuIrY JURIsPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §§1052, 1058; Notes (1931)
44 HAv. L. Rv. 1281; (1927) 43 L. Q. REv. 438.
*The same principles would, of course, be applicable to an assignee for
benefit of creditors or trustee in bankruptcy.
IPowesheik County v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 220 N. W. 63, 209 Iowa 467,
228 N. W. 32 (1928) ; cf. Capital Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, .172 U. S. .425,
19 Sup. Ct. 202, 43 L. ed. 502 (1898) (Such an action against the receiver of
a national bank raises no federal question.)
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the original trustee has so retained this property that in some form it
has passed with his estate into the hands of the receiver.5 These prin-
ciples, though easily stated, are so general in their scope that their de-
limitation by various rules of application has been found necessary.
At common law it was required that the cestui trace and identify his
specific property, or its product, in the hands of the trustee.0 Thus,
if the res was money, and this money had been mingled with that of the
trustee, the cestui was reduced to the status of a mere creditor, since his
money had no "ear mark" and could no longer be traced. With the ad-
vent of modern commercial practices -this rule, though simple to ap-
ply, as often as not proved conducive to gross injustice, and it was dis-
carded by the famous English case of In Re Hallett's Estate,7 decided
in 1879. It was there held that, where the trustee has mingled trust
money with his own, the trust was not thereby terminated, but that the
cestui wa entitled to the proportion of the fund which his money had
contributed,8 and moreover, that, should the trustee withdraw his money
from this fund, it would be presumed that he intended first to withdraw
his own money before dissipating the trust. 9 Thus the cestid was en-
titled to recover the amount of the trust, not to exceed the lowest amount
which the fund had contained between the time of the commingling and
the commencement of the action.10 This case has been accorded the
almost unanimous approval of the American courts.'1 However, there
INote (1928) 13 MINN. L. REv. 39.
'Ex Parte Dale & Co., 11 Ch. Div. 772 (1879); Mills v. Post, 76 Mo. 426(1882); Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. 16 (1853).
"13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879).
1 It would seem that the cestii is given a choice between two remedies: (a) an
equitable lien not to exceed the lowest point which the fund has reached between
the wrongful commingling and the receivership, or (b) under the constructive
trust theory, he may be considered as 'beneficial part-owner of the fund, his inter-
est to be proportionate to the contribution which his property has made thereto.
Williston, The Right to Follow Trust Property when Confused with Other
Property (1888) 2 HIv. L. REv. 28; Ames, Following Misappropriated Property
into Its Product (1906) 19 HARV. L. REv. 511; Scott, The Right to Follow Money
Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money (1913) 27 HAv. L. REv. 125.
IIt was ruled at one time that the "first money in first money out" doctrine
was applicable in this situation. Pennell v. Duffell, 4 De G., M. & G. 372 (Ch.
1853).
"It is to be remembered, however, that the presumption is one, not of law, but
of fact, and consequently may be rebutted. Thus, where the trustee has withdrawn
more than his own credit, the presumption is rebutted to the extent of his inroads
upon the trust fund. Likewise, there are other circumstances which have been
held to. successfully rebut the presumption. Where the first withdrawals from the
commingled fund were preserved and subsequent withdrawals dissipated, it was
held that the trust attached to the proceeds of the first withdrawals. Brennan v.
Tillinghast, 201 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913). Also a showing that the trust
money was obtained by the bank through the willful and criminal acts of its agents
has been held sufficient -to rebut the presumption. It re First State Bank, 152
Iowa 724, 133 N. W. 354 (1911).
a' Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed.693 (1881); BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) pp. 521-535; Note (1929) 16 VA. L. REv. 392.
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are some courts which have extended the ruling to a rather illogical con-
clusion, namely, that the trust will attach to the entire estate so long as
it may be shown that the estate was, at the outset, augmented by the
commingling, and that the trust fund 'has not been dissipated, in this
latter regard the cestui being aided by the presumption mentioned
above. 12 But the majority have more conservatively required that the
trust money be traced into some particular fund or asset before equity
will lend its aid.' 3
The North Carolina law on the subject is not entirely clear. In the
earlier cases our Court definitely espoused the old "ear mark" precept,
and the commingling of trust funds dissipated the trust.14  However,
it was subsequently decided that a special deposit, or a deposit for a
specific purpose,15 was entitled to a "preference" in the distribution of
the assets of an insolvent bank."0 It would seem that, since the reason
for this holding was that these types of deposits were impressed with a
trust, the same rule would apply where the bank received the money in
pursuance of a strict trusteeship, but that apparently -has not been the sit-
uation. Reasonable distinctions in this regard are not readily discern-
"Meyers v. Board of Education of City of Clay Center, 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac.
658 (1893); Eastman v. Farmers' State Bank, 175 Minn. 336, 221 N. W. 236
(1928) ; State v. Page Bank, 322 Mb. 29, 14 S. W. (2d) 597 (1929).
Schuyler v. Littlefield, 232 U. S. 707, 34 Sup. Ct. 466, 58 L. ed. 806 (1913) ;
Board of Com'rs of Crawford County v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) ;
Myers v. Matusek, 98 Fla. 1126, 125 So. 360 (1929) ; Leach v. Iowa State Say.
Bank, 204 Iowa 497, 215 N. W. 728 (1927) ; In re State Bank of Portland, 110
Ore. 61, 222 Pac. 740 (1924) ; cf. Peurifoy v. Boswell, 162 S. C. 107, 160 S. E.
156 (1931). Townsend, Tracing Technique hp Bank Preference Cases (1933) 7
U. oF CiN. L. REv. 201.
"First Nat. Bank v. Davis, 114 N. C. 344, 19 S. E. 280 (1894) ; Commercial &
Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Davis, 115 N. C. 226, 20 S. E. 370 (1894) ; Corporation Com-
mission v. Bank, 137 N. C. 697, 50 S. E. 308 (1905) ; Virginia-Carolina Chemical
Co. v. Rogers, 172 N. C. 154, 9(0 S. E. 129 (1916) ; cf. Commercial Nat. Bank v.
Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533, 37 L. ed. 363 (1892) ; Whitley v. Foy,
59 N. C. 34, 78 Am. Dec. 236 (1860).
Accord: J. Allen Smith & Co. v. Montgomery, 209 Ala. 100, 95 So. 291 (1923);
Acuntius v. Steneck Trust Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 81, 161 AtI. 349 (1932).
"A special deposit is created when money, or other property, is placed with
the bank for safe keeping merely, and not with the intention that it is to be min-
gled with the other money in the bank. Thus a type of bailment exists. While a
deposit for a specific purpose is, as the name implies, one made under an agree-
ment that it is to be put to some designated use, as the payment of interest on some
obligation of the depositor, the purchase of certain securities, etc. See Notes
(1923) 12 CALIF. L. REv. 214; (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 603.
"0Corporation Commission v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 194 N. C. 125,
138 S. E. 530 (1927) ; Parker v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 202 N. C. 230, 162
S. E. 564 (1932) commented upon (1932) 10 N. C. L. REV. 381, (1932) 38 W. VA.
L. Q. 365; Heckstall v. Citizens Bank, 202 N. C. 350, 163 S. E. 107 (1932) ; Flack
v. Hood, 204 N. C. 337, 168 S. E. 520 (1933) ; Smith v. Hood, 204 N. C. 343, 168
S. E. 527 (1933) ; Asheville Safe Deposit Co. v. Hood, 204 N. C. 346, 168 S. E.
524 (1933) ; Real Estate Trust Co. v. Hood, 204 N. C. 778, 168 S. E. 530 (1933) ;
Lawrence v. Hood, 205 N. C. 268, 170 S. E. 926 (1933) ; Brunswick County v.
North Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 206 N. C. 127, 173 S. E. 327 (1934).
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ible, yet the cases in which recovery has been allowed have usually, but
not always, 17 dealt with special deposits or deposits for a specific pur-
pose,I s while those in which recovery has been denied have been held to
involve unidentifiable trust funds.19
The inconsistencies of the North Carolina cases are clearly indicated
by a contrast with the instant case. In the Lauerhass Case,20 decided
last year, suit was brought by the holder of participation certificates in
this same "Mortgage Pool Account." The bank, after administration,
had been acting in the capacity of trustee of an estate which the plaintiff
had inherited from his mother, and among the securities purchased by
the bank in such capacity were notes, bought from itself, and two partici-
pation certificates. The bank's combined profits from these transactions,
amounting to some $11,000, were declared a preferred claim. As the
opinion is per curiam, it is difficult to ascertain the theory of the hold-
ing, but it was declared to be upon the authority of Flack v. Hood,21
which is one of the specific deposit cases.
In the instant case, however, this theory is declared inapplicable on
the grounds that the transaction was no more than a mere shifting of
credits which did not augment the assets of the bank. Though there is
some authority to the contrary,22 North Carolina is in line with the
United States Supreme Court, and a majority of states elsewhere, in
holding that a check upon a deposit in the trustee bank itself is merely
a shifting of credits, and, therefore, even when presented to the bank for
the purpose of creating a trust or special deposit, will not give rise to
a preferential claim upon the bank's insolvency.2 Since the securities in
the present case were paid for largely by checks drawn by the trust
department upon deposits in the commercial department, these authori-
Peoples Nat. Bank v. Waggoner, 185 N. C. 297 117 S. E. 6 (1923).
See cases cited in note 16, upra.
Roebuck v. National Surety Co., 200 N. C. 196, 156 S. E. 531 (1930) ; First &
Citizens Nat. Bank v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C. 381, 160 S. E. 360(1931); Hicks v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C. 819, 161 S. E. 545 (1931);
In re Gardner Banking & Trust Co., 204 N. C. 791, 168 S. E. 813 (1933); cf.
Underwood v. Hood, 205 N. C. 399, 171 S. E. 364 (1933).
Lauerhass v. Hood, 205 N. C. 190, 170 S. E. 655 (1933).
204 N. C. 337, 168 S. E. 520 (1933).
'This is upon the theory that the transaction is tantamount to the depositor's
withdrawing his money from the bank and handing it back in the form of a trust
or special deposit. Thus, if the depositor does not have a balance sufficient to cover
the check, the assets of the bank will not be augmented. Matzen v. Johnson, 127
Kan. 139, 272 Pac.'164 (1928).
' Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U. S. 254, 52 Sup. Ct. 516, 76 L. ed. 1089 (1932) ; Wil-
lians v. Hood, 204 N. C. 140, 167 S. E. 574 (1933) ; In re Bank of Pender, 204 N.
C. 143, 167 S. E. 561 (1933); Dupree v. Harrell, 205 N. C. 595, 172 S. E. 214
(1933) ; cf. Zachery v. Hood, 205 N. C. 194, 170 S. E. 641 (1933) (Attachment of
husband's deposit in wife's action for subsistence, and judgment that it be paid to
plaintiff from time to time under court order, changed deposit from general to
special).
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ties might be controlling were it not for the fact that the money here
alleged to be held under a trust was already the subject of an express
trust before these checks were issued. It would seem that if the origi-
nal trust money "had a string tied to it or an invisible legal fence about
it, setting it apart from the general funds of the bank," 24 it would take
something more than a mere shifting of credits and exchange of checks
between commercial and trust departments to sever the string or destroy
the fence. The problem is not whether the bank got the money, but
whether it got rid of it.25
JOEL B. ADAms.
Conflict of Laws-Insurance-Validity of $tatutes Localizing
Insurance Contracts.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.'
thwarted an attempt of the State of Mississippi to draw within the
dominion of its local laws, by statutory enactment,2 "all contracts of
insurance on property, lives, or interests in" Mississippi. The device
employed was a legislative declaration that all such contracts "shall be
deemed to be made therein."
North Carolina is one of the few jurisdictions which have attempted
in this way to "eliminate" the conflict of law between states,3 and the
First Nat. Bank v. Hood, 204 N. C. 351, 353, 168 S. E. 528, 529 (1933).
In the case of Cocke v. Hood, 205 N. C. 832, 170 S. E. 637 (1933), the
court experienced no difficulty in giving these same trustees a preferential claim
for the $4,072.66 uninvested cash balance to the credit of the "Mortgage Pool Ac-
count." This was a byproduct of the same bookkeeping transaction. But cf.
Edisto Nat. Bank v. Bryant, 72 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) (Funds on
deposit before bank appointed co-executor held not to create trust in hands of
receiver upon bank's subsequent insolvency).
154 Sup. Ct. 634 (U. S. 1934).
2Miss. CoDE ANN. (1930) §5131.
3N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6287. For cases in which this section
has been applied or referred to, but not discussed, see Fountain & Herrington v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 Fed. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932) ; Horton v. Insurance
Co., 122 N. C. 498, 29 S. E. 944, (1898) ; Blackwell v. Life Ass'n., 141 N. C. 117,
53 S. E. 833 (1906) ; Williams v. Life Ass'n., 145 N. C. 128, 58 S. E. 802 (1907) ;
Williams v. Order of Heptasophs, 172 N. C. 787, 90 S. E. 888 (1916) ; Wilson v.
Order of Heptasophs, 174 N. C. 628, 94 S. E. 443 (1917).
The above section also contains a provision that "all contracts of insurance
the applications for which are taken within the state shall be deemed to have
been made within this state and are subject to the laws thereof." This language
will be found substantially duplicated in ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) §8375. While
this provision is not specifically dealt with in the text discussion, it is believed
that the reasoning of the discussion adequately covers it.
Massachusetts at one time had a provision substantially like that of Mis-
sissippi. (Acts 1894 c. 522, §3). It was construed in Stone v. Old Colony St.
Ry. Co., 212 Mass. 459, 99 N. E. 218 (1912) as not intended td'regulate or pro-
hibit contracts of insurance made outside Massachusetts. The present Massachu-
